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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGARD TO RATE
REGULATION*
By THom s PoRTE HARDmAN**
That the law of today is what the courts would decide today,
not merely what the precedents say', is strikingly illustrated by a
series of recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the basic
value or the basic investment upon which a public utility is consti-
tutionally entitled to earn a return, and in particular with the in-
clusion or exclusion of going-concern value or going-concern invest-
ment2 . Accordingly the purpose of my paper is to discuss this
aspect of the progress of the law of public utilities since this con-
ference last convened3 .
Others in this conference and elsewhere have recently discussed
the so-called present-value doctrine in rate regulation and have
shown, among other things, that basing rates on present value
involves "the vicious circle" in that the value of a public utility,
strictly speaking, depends upon the rate of return and the rate
of return is the very thing that is in issue4 . Hence, while I quite
agree with this criticism and with the recent concurring opinion
* A paper read at the Conference on Public Law at the Meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools in Chicago, December 1923.
** Professor of Law, west Virginia University.
I Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 HARv. L. Rv. 457, 461
(1897) : "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
2 Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 388 (1922) : Houston v. South-
weston Bell Telephone Co. 259 U. S. 318 (1922) ; State of Mo. ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Mo., 262 U. S. 276 (1923);
Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia. 262 U. S. 625
(1923) ; Bluefleld Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission
of W. Va., 262 U. S. 679 (1923), reversing 89 W. Va. 736 (1921).
3 For a discussion of the earlier law on this question, under the then "orthodox"
present-value doctrine, see Hardman, "Going Value as Value for Purposes of Rate
Regulation," 25 W. VA. L. QUAR. 89 (1918). In the present paper a new rate
base, with its incidents, is advocated.
' See Hale, "The 'Physical Value' Fallacy in Rate Cases," 30 YALE L. J. 710
(1921) ; Hale, "Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept," 22 CoL. L.
REV. 209 (1922); Richberg, "A Permanent Basis for Rate Regulation," 31YALE L.
J. 263 (1922) ; of. Henderson. "Railway Valuation and the Courts," 33 HAtv. L.
REV. 902 and 1031 (1920) ; E. C. Goddard, "Public Utility Valuation," 15 MIcE. L.
REv. 205 (1917) ; Note by E. C. G., 19 MicH. L_ REv. 849 (1921) ; Dorety, "The
Function of Reproduction Cost in Public Utility Valuation and Rate Making," 37
HA v. L. REv. 173, 189 (1923).
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RAT EGULATION
of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes 5 that the present-
value doctrine is "legally and economically unsound" and that the
prudent-investment doctrine is preferable, I shall not now touch
upon that question except incidentally.
As every one knows, the majority of the United States Supreme
Court, the final arbiter of the whole question, still purports to
hold that in cases of rate regulation a public utility is constitu-
tionally entitled to earn a return upon the so-called present value
of its property". But in one recent case where this so-called present
value, if calculated as of the time of the valuation, would have
been abnormally high, and there was, or probably would be, a trend
toward a lower level, the majority of the Supreme Court sanctioned
a so-called present value based, primarily at least, on prices or
values prevailing at a time prior to the valuation, thus eliminating
at least a part of the unearned increment and arriving at a rate
base perhaps somewhat approximating the prudent investment7.
And apparently, if the so-called present value calculated as of the
time of the valuation would be abnormally low, at any rate if there
was a trend, or probable trend, of prices toward a higher level,
the Supreme Court would uphold a value higher than the value
at the time of the valuation, thus prima facie sanctioning a pro-
spective unearned increment, but sanctioning it perhaps in order
to arrive at a value approximating the prudent investment; for,
according to Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmess,
"What is now termed the prudent investment is, in essence, the
same thing as that which the court has always sought to protect
in using the term present value." 9
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently insists that so-called
present value must be based partly on the estimated future value
of the property, calculated with reference to the probable level
In State of Mo. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission of Mo., supra note 2. The minority opinion is by Mr. Justice Brandeis,
with whom Mr. Justice Holmes concurs. This opinion dissents from the reasoning
but concurs in the conclusions, of the majority. The majority opinion says that
the rate regulation in question is confiscatory for the reason that it prevents the
utility from earning a fair return on the present value of its property. Mr.
Justice Brandeis says: "I concur in the judgment of reversal. But I do so on the
ground that the order of the state commission prevents the utility from earning
a fair return on the amount prudently invested in it . . . . The so-called
rule of Smyth -,. Ames is, in my opinion, legally and economically unsound."
6 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898) ; and cases cited supra note 2.
7 Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, supra note 2. See
particularly the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McKenna.
a State of Mo. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of Mo., supra note 2, at pp. 308-309.
0 "Compare Mr. Justice Field in Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 343,
344; Mr. Justice Harlan, ibid. p. 341; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680. 690, 691;
and Reagan -v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 409, 412: where the
necessity of limiting the broad power of regulation enunciated in Munn v. Illinois,
84 U. S. 113, was first given expression. See also. "Public Utilities, Their Cost
New and Depreciation," by H. V. Hayes, pp. 255, 256."
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
of future prices', so that under the doctrine of the majority
of the Suprme Court, value for purposes of rate regulation is now
not merely a present value, whatever the word value may mean
in this connection, but a composite present and future value-a
value, however, which, according to Mr. Justice Brandeis and
Mr. Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court seeks to calculate so as
to make it protect the prudent investment. Such future value,
however, was sanctioned in cases in which prices or values were
abnormally high and there was, or probably would be, a trend
toward a lower level. One wonders what the majority of the
court would say in regard to cases in which it appeared that the
so-called present value calculated as of the time of the valuation
was the same as the prudent investment but in which prices, then
normal, were trending either toward a higher or toward a lower
level. Would the Court then adhere to its recent ruling that:
"An honest and intelligent forecast of probable future values
made upon a view of all the relevant circumstances, is essen-
tial?"1'
If so, present value so calculated would protect less than the pru-
dent investment when the trend was toward a lower level, and
would protect more than the prudent investment when the trend
was toward a higher level.
However, until Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes can
induce the majority of the Court to cease to base rates on so-called
value, it is perhaps less objectionable to base rates partly on the
probable future value of the property than on a value calculated as
of the time of the valuation; for, at any rate under present
conditions, not only does it permit the courts and commissions by
a fiction to fix a so-called present value approximating the pru-
dent investment, but, since the rate is to operate in futuro, the rate
base should, so far as practicable, be a base that would exist, with
as little change as possible, during the period in which the rate
is to operate. Values at the time of the valuation may be abnormal
and with a trend, or probable trend, toward a higher or lower level.
Therefore value based partly on the probable future value of
the plant under the predicted new level of prices might more closely
approximate the average value of the property during the period
when the rate now fixed will operate. This, whether such average
value did or did not approximate the prudent investment, would
10 State of Mo. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission of Mo., supra note 2; Bluefleld Water Works & Improvement Co. V. Public
Service Commission of W. Va., supra note 2.
u The quotation is from the cases cltdd supra note 10.
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reduce the frequency of the need for a new rate investigation;12
and, if it approximated the prudent investment, so much the bet-
ter. Hench, to the extent that the value accepted as the rate base
is the predicted value under future conditions, and to the extent
that the prediction as to values is fulfilled, there might be an
increased amount of stability, a very desirable quality, in the
public utility world. But who can predict, with a reasonable degree
of certainty, future prices or future values?"' Stability cannot
be established by unstable standards.
But whether the rate base adopted in a given case is the invest-
ment prudently made and properly managed, 4 or so-called present
value, calculated solely on the basis of prices prevailing at or
before the time of the valuation, as was commonly done until
recently,' 5 or calculated partly on the basis of a predicted new level
3- The frequency of the need for a new rate investigation under the present-
value doctrine is one of the serious objections to that doctrine. If value is accepted
as the rate base every fluctuation in value involves the ascertainment of a new rate
base. The present-value doctrine, in its common form, is therefore impractical. And,
as "law is a practical matter," Pound, "Juristic Science and Law," 31 HARv. L.
REV. 1047, 1058 (1918), the doctrine, if applied at all, should be applied in a
practical way.
2 Cf. ir. Justice Brandeis in State of Mo. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. v. Public Service Commission of Mo., supra note 2 at pp. 303, 304: "Engineers
testifying in recent rate cases have assumed that there will be a new plateau of
prices. In Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 388, the company contended
that a plateau 70 per cent above the price level of 1914 should be accepted, and
a plateau 33-1/3 per cent. above was found probable by the master and assumed to
be such by the lower court. In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 000, post, one 50 per cent. above the 1914 level was
contended for; in the case at bar a plateau 25 per cent. above. But for the
assumption that there will be a plateau there Is no basis in American experience.
The course of prices for the last 112 years indicates, on the contrary, that there
may be a practically continuous decline for nearly a generation ; that the present
price level may fall to that of 1914;within a decade; and that, later, it may fall much
lower. Prices rose steadily (with but slight and short recessions for the 20 years
before the United States entered the World War. From the low level of 1897
they rose 21 per cent to 1900 ; then rose further (with minor fluctuations, repre-
senting times of good business or bad) and reached in 1914 a point 50 per cent.
above the 1897 level. Then the great rise incident to the war set In. "Wholesale
Prices. 1890 to 1921," U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bulletin No. 320. pp. 9-26. These are averages of the wholesale prices of all
commodities. In the Bureau chart the 1913 prices are taken as the datum line
(100). As compared with them the 1897 level was 67, the 1900 level 81. The
chart of page 10 of the pamphlet entitled, "Price Changes and Business Prospects,"
published by the Cleveland Trust Company, gives price fluctuations for the 110
years prior to 1921. It shows three abrupt rises in the price level, by reason of war;
and some less abrupt falls, by reason of financial panic. These may be called
abnormal. But the normal has never been a plateau. The chart shows that the
peak price levels were practically the same during the War of 1812, the Civil War
and the World War; and it shows that practically continuous declines, for about
30 years, followed the first two wars. The experience after the third may be
similar."
1, The term prudent investment, as Mr. Justice Brandeis expressed it in the last
cited case, "is not used in a critical sense. There should not be excluded from
the finding of the base, investments which, under ordinary circumstances, would be
deemed reasonable. The term is applied for the purpope of excluding what might
be found to be dishonest, or obviously wasteful or imprudent expenditures. Every
investment may be assumed to have been made in the exercise of reasonable judgment,
unless the contrary is shown."
See Richberg, op. cit., supra note 4.
"1 See. e.g., Willcox v Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 52 (1909) : "The value
If the propert~y is to be determined as of the time when the inquiry is made regarding
the rates."
4
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of prices, as in some recent cases," e is there any justification for
the Supreme Court's recent ruling that:
"Whether going concern value should be considered and
allowed at all in determining the rate base for rate making, and
if allowed what the amount of it should be, depends upon the
financial history of the company?"'7
The importance of the problem is illustrated in a late decision
of a state public service commission, in which it is said:
"Commissions and courts differ widely in their conclusions
[as to going value]. In some quarters going value is seldom or
never allowed: in others it is calculated upon deficiency in earn-
ings or preliminary costs of financing and securing rights. In
Galveston Electric Company v. Galveston18, the United States
Supreme Court held that the determination of this factor de-
pends upon the history of the company. From a careful consid-
eration of the point the commission believes this item should be
represented in the sum of $55,000.00, [which was about 2 %
of the total value allowed]."
19
And in a late Federal case the Court said :20
"In Galveston Electric Company v. Galveston it appears to
be settled that the going-concern value cannot be considered in
ascertaining just rates."
21
16 See, e. g., cases cited in note 10, supra. See also Monroe Gas Light & Fuel Co.
v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, P. U. R. 1923 E, 661 (Fed. D. C. 1923);
Re Pocotello Gas & Power Co. P. U. R. 1923 C, 25 (Idaho, P. U. C., 1922). Note
14 to Mr. Justice Brandeis' learned opinion in State of Mo. ex rel Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Mo., supra note 2, contains the follow-
ing Interesting summary of recent methods of calculating the rate base:
"The Public Utility Reports for 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1923 (to March 1) contain
363 cases in which the rate-base or value was passed upon. Reproduction cost at
unit prices prevailing at the date of valuation appears to have been the predominant
element in fixing the rate base In only 5. In 63 the commission severely criticised, or
expressly repudiated, this measure of value. In nearly all of the 363 cases,
except 5, the commission either refused to pay heed to this factor as the measure of
value, or Indeed as evidence of any great weight.
The following summary shows the predominant element in fixing the rate base
in the several cases:
In 5 cases: Reproduction cost at unit prices prevailing at the date of the
valuation.
In 28 cases: Reproduction cost at unit prices prevailing at some date, or the
averages of some period, prior to the date of the valuation.
In 12 cases: Reproduction cost at unit prices prevailing at some date not specific-
ally stated.
In 22 cases: Reproduction cost of an inventory of a prior date at prices pre-
vailing at that date or prior thereto, plus subsequent additions
at actual cost (so-called split inventory method).
In 3 cases: Reproduction cost on basis of future predicted prices (so-called
trend prices, or new plateau method).
In 102 cases: A, prior valuation by the commission plus the actual cost of subse-
quent additions.
In 85 case.: The actual original cost (including both Initial cost and additions).
In 6 cases: Original cost arbitrarily appreciated.
In 27 cases: The historical cost or prudent investment.
In 28 cases: Book cost or investment.
In 12 cases: Bond and stock capitalization.
In 36 cases: Determination and classification of method impossible."
17 Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra note 2 at p. 325. See Galveston
Electric Co. v. Galveston, supra note 2.
'B Supra, note 2.
19 Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel Newport News v. Newport News Light &
Water Co., P. U. R. 1923D 91, 108 (1923).
0 Jacksonville Gas Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 286 Fed. 404, 407 (1923).
21 This statement, however, is unwarranted as is shown by the fact that in the
subsequent case of Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia,
supra note 2, the United States Supreme Court allowed an item of $441,629 as
"going-concern" value.
5
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The court, therefore, totally excluded the estimated going value,
viz., $269,000, which the commission had allowed.
Of course, whether going-concern value, or going value, either
in whole or in part, constitutes value for purposes of rate regulation
depends, in the first place, on what is taken as constituting going
value, and, in the second place, on what doctrine is adopted as
to the rate base, i.e., for present purposes depends on whether the
rate base adopted in the given case is so-called present value or,
what we may call for immediate purpose, though rather inaccu-
rately, prudent-investment value, that is, the amount prudently
invested and properly managed. First, then, what is going value?
In the leading case on the question the Supreme Court defined
"going value" as "the value which inheres in a plant where its
business is established as distinguished from one which has yet to
establish its business," 22 but excluding, of course, good-will value2 l.
And this conception of going value the Supreme Court has never
repudiated.2- Moreover, in that case the Supreme Court held un-
qualifiedly, and so held until recently, that "going value"
[thus defined, i.e., going value not including good-wiil value]
"is a property right and should be considered in determining the
value of the property, upon which the owner has a right to make
a fair return."'2 5 Is there, then, any sound reason for the Supreme
Court's recent departure from precedent on this point? In Gal-
veston Electric Company v. Galveston5 , the only case which the
Supreme Court cited in its recent decision to support its proposi-
tion that whether going value is to be considered at all in rate
cases "depends upon the financial history of the company," the
Supreme Court, in a case in which present value was permitted
to be calculated primarily on the basis of the cost of reproducing
the plant, held, in effect, that "the cost of developing an operating
utility into a financially successful concern" is not to be considered
in calculating value for rate-making purposes, namely, in calcu-
lating going value. In that case, which was decided only last year,
the utility, apparently because of insufficient patronage and an un-
developed operating system, not because of insufficient rates, had
for a considerable time been unable to realize a reasonable return
on the value of its property. Now, it seems indisputable that, if
Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 165 (1915).
' Id. Of course, good-will value, while logically a pari4 of going-concern value as
above defined, is not value for purposes of rate regulation. See Hardman, op. cit.,
supra note 3.
See Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178 (1918).
: Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra note 22, at p. 165; Denver v.
Denver Union water Co., supra note 24, at p. 192. Italics ours.
2 Supra note 2.
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value is taken either in its strict or economic sense, or in the
sense of prudent investment, then, in that type of case, viz., where
there has been an unremunerative development period, due to
insufficient patronage and an unedveloped operating system, "the
value which inheres in a plant where its business is established
as distinguished from one which has yet to establish its business"
is a very important part of the value of such a plant.
To illustrate, suppose that, exclusive of going value, the so-called
present value of a plant properly constructed and sufficiently
needed, is $1,000,000, and that the amount prudently invested in
the plant, exclusive of the cost of establishing the business, is also
$1,000,000. Suppose further that for the first five years of opera-
tion the utility paid only proper operating expenses, although it
charged rates that yielded a maximum return, and for the sixth
year the utility, after deducting proper operating expenses for that
year, earned a reasonable return upon its value or investment, ex-
clusive of that value or investment which represents the cost of
establishing the business. What is the going value of the plant in
the sense in which the Supreme Court uses going value? For
five years $1,000,000 invested in a public utility has been unremun-
erative. Yet this $1,000,000 invested in other businesses would
normally have earned, say, 6% per annum, or a total, for the five
years, of $300,000; or, if this money were borrowed the interest on
the money for that period at 6% would be $300,000. Hence this
one item of "the cost of developing the operating system into a
financially successful concern" has been about $300,000. And
many other things costing money or money's worth, such as physical
and mental effort in securing customers and developing an efficient
operating system, have been expended in building up this going-
concern part of the plant 27. Yet, in just that sort of case and a case
in which the Supreme Court approved a so-called present value
based primarily on the cost of reproduction, the Supreme Court,
v Cf. Miller, J., in the leading case of People v. Willcox, 210 N. Y. 479, 486. 104
N. E. 911 (1914):
"What then, is 'going value' and how is it to be appraised?
"It takes time to put a new enterprise of any magnitude on Its feet, after the
construction work has been finished. Mistakes of construction have to be corrected.
Substitutions have to be made. Economies have to be studied. Experiments have
to be made, which sometimes turn out to be useless. An organization has to be
perfected. Business has to be solicited and advertised for. In the case of a gas
company, gratuitous work has to be done, such as selling appliances at less than a
fair profit and demonstrating new devices to induce consumption of gas and to
educate the public up to the maximum point of consumption. None of those
things is reflected in the value of the physical property, unless, of course, exchange
value be taken,- which Is not admissible In a rate case. The company starts out
with the 'bare bones' of the plant, to borrow Mr. Justice Lurton's phase in Omaha
Waterworks cacse, supra. By the expenditure of time, labor and money it co-
ordinates those bones into an efficient working organism and acquires a paying
business. The proper and reasonable cost of doing that, whether included in
operating expenses or not, is as much a part of the investment of the company
as the cost of the physical proprty."
7
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in effect, refused to allow any going value calculated on the cost
of reproducing this going-concern element of the total value of
the plant.
The view of the Supreme Court on this point will be clarified by
considering briefly what the master in chancery and what the
lower court held. The master allowed the sum of $520,000 as
going value, and, as the master adopted what we may, for present
purposes, call the reproduction-cost method of calculating present
value, i.e., a method based primarily on the cost of reproduction,
this going value was calculated on the basis of "the cost of develop-
ing the operating system into a financially successful concern,"
though the evidence of this cost, which was relied upon, was appar-
ently the accrued losses during the unremunerative development
period. The lower court, in refusing to allow such going value,
said:28
"The allowance of any element for development cost cannot,
in a judicial proceeding, be reasonably sustained, for the reason
that such a utility is entitled to a reasonable rate of return upon
its plant from the day it goes into operation, and the court does
not take into consideration at all that there may be lean years
before the fat ones."
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming this holding,
said:
"Going concern value and development cost, in the sense in
which the master used these terms, are not to be included in
the base value for the purpose of determining whether the
rate is confiscatory." " . . . . The fact that a sometime
losing business becomes profitable eventually through growth
of the community, or more efficient management, tends to prove
merely that the venture was not wholly misconceived."
With deference, it is submitted that the reasoning of both courts
is erroneous. In the first place, it seems unsound to say, as the
Supreme Court said, that "the fact that a sometime losing busi-
ness becomes profitable eventually through growth of the commun-
ity, or more efficient management, tends to prove merely that the
venture was not wholly misconceived." It, of course, tends to
prove that; but, if we take value in the strict or economic sense
in this connection, then it also tends to prove that the value of the
plant with such a successful business established is greater than
the value of the very same physical plant before it thus established
its business. The whole difficulty, of course, arises out of the failure
to adopt some definite conception of the meaning of value for
purposes of rate regulation or, more accurately, to adopt some
' Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, 272 Fed. 147, 160 (1921).
8
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definite rate base. Does the Supreme Court by saying that "the
fact that a sometime losing business becomes profitable eventually
through growth of the community . . . tends to prove
merely that the venture was not wholly misconceived" mean to
intimate that value represented by unearned increment arising
"through growth of the community" is not to be considered value
for rate-making purposes? If so, the Supreme Court's so-called
present-value doctrine is not what it used to be3". And in this con-
n:ection, it is interesting to remember that the opinion of the
Court in that case-the Galveston case-is by Mr. Justice Brandeis,
and that in a somewhat later case3' Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a
concurring opinion, not only vigorously condemns the present-value
doctrine as "legally and economically unsound" and strenuously
advocates the substitution of the prudent-investment doctrine,
but he says that "what is now termed the prudent investment is,
in essence, the same thing as that which the Court has always sought
to protect in using the term present value." Of course, if so-
called present value means prudent investment, then the incre-
ment in value arising "through growth of the community" is not
value for rate-making purposes, for the prudent-investment doc-
trine ex vi termini eliminates the unearned-increment element of
value. Indeed, in this connection, it has recently been asserted
that "the item of going-concern value does not arise under the
prudent investment theory."3 2 But even if the prudent-investment
theory is adopted, or, if as Mr. Justice Brandeis says, what the
Supreme Court seeks to protect by its present-value doctrine is,
in essence, the prudent investment, is it justifiable to eliminate
from the rate base that element of effort which produces a more
efficient management, or which represents "the cost of developing
the operating system into a financially successful concern"?
Clearly such outlay is an investment costing money or money's
worth, and if prudently made and properly managed should be
allowed just as much as an investment in the physical plant. This
29 Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, supra note 2, at pp. 396, 397, 395.
Italics ours.
z It is not intended to Intimate that the United States Supreme Court does not
now sanction unearned increment, for in one of its latest decisions, Georgia Ry. &
Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, supra note 2, at pp. 630, 631, the
court said : "that part of the rule which declares the utility entitled to the benefit
of Increases in the value of property was, however, specifically applied in the
allowance of $125,000 made by the commission to represent the appreciation In the
value of the land owned . . . . In Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S.
19, 52, it had been made clear 'that the value of the property Is to be determined as
of the time when the inquiry is made concerning the rates. If the property, which
legally enters into the consideration of the question of rates, has increased In value
since it was acquired, the company Is entitled to the benefit of such increase!'"
n State of Mo. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission
of Mo., spra note 2.
g2 Note, 32 YAIE L. J. 507 (1923).
9
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seems indisputable unless such cost is permitted to be charged to
operating expense, and even then the result, as we shall subse-
quently see, is probably the same. But such cost should not be
charged to operating expense, for the reason that it is not an
expense incident to ordinary operation, but, like the investment
in the physical plant, is an expense which has built up a durable
instrument of production and which year after year without
further outlay earns, and will continue to earn, its share of the total
returns. Hence, this investment, being like the investment in the
physical plant, a durable instrument of production, is capital in-
vestment and should, just as much as the investment in the physical
plant, be allowed during its existence to earn its reasonable return.
Of course, the Supreme Court, in thus departing form precedent,
says, by way of dictum, that while such going value is not a part of
the rate base, "the fact that a utility may reach financial success
only in time . . . is a reason for allowing a liberal return on
the money invested in the enterprise." 3 But "the cost of develop-
ing the operating system into a financially successful concern" is
"money invested in the enterprise." Besides, is that a reasonably
certain way to secure to the utility a reasonable return on "the
money invested in the enterprise," including the cost of establish-
ing its business? What is a liberal return? Is the liberal return
to be allowed with reference to all future rates or only until the
cost of establishing the business is amortized from the so-called
liberal returns? The Supreme Court does not answer. Nor does
it appear that the Court allowed a higher rate of return because of
this cost. Such an indefinite method of attempting to compensate
for such necessary cost is too uncertain to secure adequately the
investors' individual interests of substance and the important social
interest in the general security, including stability in the public
utility field-interests which, in this respect, clearly outweigh any
other conflicting interests. Therefore, since the end of law today is
to secure a maximum of interests with a minimum sacrifice of inter-
ests,34 if we balance the interests with a view to the socialization
of the law, 35 those interests should be secured and the other interests
sacrificed. Besides, this method is, at any rate on the face of it,
the result of a failure to appreciate the true nature of this going-
1 Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, supra note 2, at p. 395.
34 See Pound, '"The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines,"
27 HAav. L, REV. 195 (1914); Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Juristic
Thought," 27 HARV. L. REV. 605 (1914), 30 HARv. L. REV. 20 (1917) ; POUND, "AE
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW," ch. 11, (1922).
That is with a view to the emphasizing of the wants, or interests of society.
See POU.D, "THE SPIRIT OF THE COMION LAW," 129, 195 (1921). See foot note
54, infra.
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concern element; for, if the rate base is, as the majority of the
Supreme Court says it is, the present value of the plant, this
element of going value is clearly capital value, being like the value
of the physical part of the plant, a durable instrument of pro-
duction which year after year without further outlay continues
to bring in its share of the returns. Moreover, this going-concern
element or value is a continuous and durable instrument of pro-
duction, which, as we have seen in discussing the prudent-invest-
ment theory, has cost the investors money or money's equivalent.
Why, then, under the present-value theory, is not this going value
to the extent that it is based upon prudent investment, a part of
the value upon which the utility should be allowed to earn a fair
return?
It may be contended that the Supreme Court in the Galveston
Case merely meant that accrued losses, arising through failure to
charge proper rates or through imprudent management, cannot
be capitalized as a part of the rate base; for it seems that the
evidence offered to prove "the cost of developing the operating
system into a financially successful concern" was the accrued losses
during the unremunerative development period. It is quite true
that such accrued losses are not the measure of this part of the rate
base, viz, for present purposes, going value under the present
value doctrine, or prudent investment under the prudent-invest-
ment doctrine, for such losses might arise from failure to charge
proper rates, or from improper management. Therefore, it is
incorrect to calculate going going-concern value or going-concern
investment, by merely capitalizing past losses. But it seems that
the losses in this case were not losses arising from improper manage-
ment or improper rates, and there is no allegation or proof that
they were. And in a later case Mr. Justice Brandeis makes it
quite clear what he meant in this case, i.e., the Galveston Case,
for in the subsequent case he says:16
"In Galveston Electric Company v. Galveston, the cost of
developing the business as a financially successful concern was
excluded from the rate base."
And in a still later case he says impliedly that the losses in the
Galveston Case were not "due to insufficiency of previous rates.' '37
Therefore, if the public or social need justified the establishment of
the utility, as it apparently did, it being a street car case, and if the
accrued losses were, as they apparently were, the ordinary losses
a State of Mo. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Mo supra note 2, at p. 311.
87 Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, supra note 2, at
p. 632.
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due to lack of patronage and to the fact that the operating system
was not yet fully developed, then such losses, while not the meas-
ure of going-concern value or going-concern investment, are cer-
tainly good evidence of that value or investment, and, therefore,
where there is such evidence it does not seem justifiable to disre-
gard this element entirely, as the Supreme Court practically did
in the Galveston Case. Said the Court :38
"The fact that a utility may reach financial success only in
time . . . . does not make past losses an element to be
considered in deciding what the base value is and whether the
rate is confiscatory."
Nor is it justifiable to say, as the lower court said, and as the
Supreme Court apparently implied, that the development cost
of this going-concern element cannot be considered "for the reason
that such a utility is entitled to earn a reasonable rate of return
upon its plant from the day it goes into operation. "39 If a utility
were "entitled to earn a reasonable rate of return upon its plant
from the day it goes into operation," the street car company in
the case before the court might, in its pioneer stage when passengers
were few, have been obliged to charge a $5.00 fare instead of a
five cent fare. And then, too, an increased rate might well have
produced a decreased return. It may have been impossible "to
earn a reasonable rate of return." But it is quite clear upon
principle that such a high fare could not be charged for the reason
that the interests of not only the utility but of the patrons and
of society, must be considered in determining the reasonableness
of rates; and, since the end of law is to secure a maximum of inter-
est with a minimum sacrifice of other interests, upon a balancing
of the conflicting interests it seems clear that the interests of the
patrons and of society that rates shall not be unreasonably high
may so outweigh the conflicting interests of the utility that during
the development period or periods, the utility should be legally
required to forego reasonable profits to the extent that the securing
of a maximum of interests with a minimum sacrifice of other inter-
ests demands. Otherwise the end of law is not subserved. And
most of the authorities, such as they are, apparently support this
conclusion. 40 Hence, the law does not necessarily permit a public
1, Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, supra note 2, at p. 395. Italics ours.
31 Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, supra note 28, at p. 160.
.0 See, e. g., Chicago etc Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 458, particularly
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Miller at p. 459 (1890) ; Covington etc. Road
Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578, 596 (1896) ; Smyth v. Ames, supra note 6, at p. 544;
San Diego etc. Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 756, 757, (1899); Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 454 (1913) ; BEALE & WqmAN, RAILROAD RATE REGULATION,
2 ed., Sec. 212 (1915); Whitten, "Fair Value for Rate Purposes," 27 HARv. L.
REV. 419, 421, (1914) ; cf. Edgerton, "Value of the Service as a Factor in Rate
Making," 32 HARv. L. REV. 516.
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utility to realize, from its own point of view, "a reasonable rate of
return from the day it goes into operation." Moreover, it should
be remembered that such necessarily unremunerative development
period may be in part, if not in whole, a period after the utility
has for some reason been earning a reasonable return. There may
be an unavoidable loss of business and consequently a necessity
for further expenditure to re-establish the business. Therefore,
where, as in the Galveston Case, a utility has had such an unremun-
erative period, the law should permit the utility, after it is in
successful operation, or after it is again in successful operation, to
base rates on this going-concern element so as to enable the utility
to. realize a reasonable return upon this investment or value, at
any rate to the extent that such period was not caused by misman-
agement or improper rates, and provided, of course, that the
establishment of the business is in furtherance of a real public or
social need. And in order adequately to secure the present patrons'
individual interests of substance, and the social interests in the
general security, by not making the patron of only one year bear
this burden, the burden should be distributed proportionately over
the entire future period of operation by allowing an increment in
the rate base. Thus, properly-incurred losses during such unre-
munerative period or periods should be considered as evidence in
determining the rate base,41 i.e., under the present-value theory in
determining going value, and under the prudent-investment theory
in determining the amount prudently invested in the going-concern
part of the plant.
This seems clear enough when after such unremunerative period
or periods the rates charged are only reasoneble. But suppose
that the rates thereafter charged are unreasonably high. May the
excess of the return over what is a reasonable return be allowed
to eliminate form the rate base this element of value or investment?
Some cases say, yes.42 But, as we have seen, this going-concern
element, under the present-value theory, is capital value and, under
the prudent-investment theory, is, either in part or in whole, capital
investment. In such a case, then, the question reduces itself
to this: May the rate base, whether capital value or capital invest-
ment, be amortized pro tanto by earnings in excess of a reasonable
return?
Perhaps it may be contended in this connection that for rate-
41 People ex rel. Kings Co. L. & Co. v. Willcox, 210 N. Y. 479, 104 N. E. 911
(1914) ; Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Westenhaver, 29 Oki. 429, 118 Pac.
354 (1911) ; re Huntington Water Corporation, P. U. R. 1922C, 636 (W..Va., P. S.
C., 1922).
42 See, e. g., People ex rel. Kings Co. L. & Co. v. Willcox, supra note 41. See
also Goddard, op, cit. supra note 4, at p. 219.
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making purposes this increment of value or investment should,
at least, not be considered in so far, if at all, as it represents
effort the cost of which has been, or probably has been charged
to operating expense. But the contention seems untenable.
In the first place, if the physical part of the utility's plant
has been partially paid for out of past excessive earnings, e.g.,
by charging the costs to operating expense, it has been held,
43
and it would seem correctly, that this does not cut down the
rate base, e.g., the present value, for purposes of rate regula-
tion, for among other reasons hereafter mentioned, if the rate
base could be thus amortized a public utility in time might
have no rate base left, and therefore would have to serve the public
gratuitously. Such an amortization of the rate base would not
properly secure the important interests involved, particularly the
paramount social interests in having adequate public service, for,
among other things, it would lead to a deterioration of the service
as there would be left no sufficient incentive to continue to render
efficient service, and investors in public utility enterprises would
withdraw their investments from public utility businesses. The
rate base must always be left such that it will be attractive for
capital not only to remain in, but to come in, when needed. If on
the other hand the cost of any part of the physical plant has been
charged to operating expense and not paid for out of excessive
earnings there has of course been no amortizaion of the rate base.
And for the same reason that the so-called physical elements of
the rate base cannot be amortized by earnings, so this intangible
going-concern element cannot.44 For, as we have seen, this going-
concern element of a plant is, in this respect and in part at least,
of precisely the same nature as the physical element of the plant,
viz., capital value or capital investment. Therefore, to that extent
both the physical element and the intangible element should be
treated alike, at any rate if the effort in producing and maintain-
ing each element was prudently spent.
In the second place, under modern systems of rate regulation
"4 Garden City v. Garden City Telephone Light & Mfg. Co., 236 Fed 693 (C. C. A..
1916) ; Chicago Rys. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 277 Fed. 970 (D. C.,
1922). See also, Bluefleld v. Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co., P. U. R. 19171D,
22, 32, 33 (W. Va. P. S. C. 1917) : "It could not be said in fairness to a utility,
that It should be deprived of a fair return on a proper valuation of its property
used in the public service at the present time because of excessive earnings it may
have realized in the past." And Mr. Justice Brandeis impliedly admits this in the
Galveston Case, supra note 2, for he says at p. 396: "If the success had been
so great that, besides paying an annual return at the rate of 8 per cent [which
was admitted to be a reasonable rate of return], a large surplus had been accumu-
lated, could the city [the regulating authority] insist that the base value be reduced
by the amount of the surplus?"
S Accord: City of Minneapolis v. Rand, 285 Fed. 818, 830 (C.C.F., 1923)
State Public Utilities Commission ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Blectric
Co., 291 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 891 (1919).
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when commissions are so careful to keep rates within the realm of
reasonableness, there is little probability of a public utility paying
for any appreciable part of its plant out of excessive earings. And
if a public utility attempts to do so, the proper remedy, in addition
to an action to recover the excess charges,4 5 would seem to be to
reduce rates to the point of reasonableness, thus leaving a certain
and stable rate base, not to reduce the rate base, thus subjecting the
utility to double reparation for the same act, and in addition in-
jecting another element of uncertainty, not only into rate making,
but also into public utility businesses, and thereby promoting and
perpetuating an already intolerable instability in a field where
paramount public and social interests in the general security have
long since been incessantly insisting upon stability.
However, this argument must not be understood to mean that the
total "cost of developing the operating system into a financially
successful concern," or that the total investment in, or total value
.of, this going-concern element is necessarily a part of the rate
base. For, just as in the case of the physical part of the plant,
so, in regard to the intangible going-concern part, investment there-
in to be allowed under the prudent-investment theory must be an
investment prudently made and properly managed;46 and value
thereof to be allowed under the present-value theory must be a
value based on the plant or the part of the plant as it should have
been constructed and maintained.4" Also, under the present-value
theory where as in the Galveston Case, so-called present value is
calculated primarily on the cost-of-reproduction basis, just as the
physical part of the plant must be depreciated to suit the present
condition of the physical property,4 8 so the intangible going-concern
part of the plant may not be as good and valuable now as it was
at the end of the cost-of-development period or periods, and, there-
fore under that theory, this going-concern element must, if neces-
sary, be likewise subjected to a sort of depreciation process to suit
45 W. Va. Transportation Co. v. Sweetzer, 25 W. Va. 434 (1885) ; Garden City V.
Garden City Telephone Light & Mfg. Co., supra note 43, at p. 697. See 10 C. J.
449-451.
46 Middlesex & Boston Rate Case, 2 Ann. Rep. Mass. P. S. C. (Vol. 1) 99. 107,
quoted in Editorial Section, "Reproduction Cost as Measure of Value," P. U. R.
1923E, iv, v. See Mr. Justice Brandeis in State of Mo. ex. rel... Southwestern Bell
Tel Co. v. Public S. Com. of Mo., supra note 2. See quotation in note 14, supra.
47 If, for example, the plant was built unreasonably large, the value for rate-
making purposes is not the total present value of the plant as It was constructed but
a present value based on the plant as It should have been constructed. San Diego
Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 446-447 (1903).
48 The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913). But, of course, if so-called
present value is calculated on some other basis such depreciation is not necessarily
proper
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the present condition of this going-concern element ;49 for under
that theory the cost of the plant, or the cost of reproducing the
plant, is only "evidence" of the present value of the plant50 and
therefore, "the cost of developing the operating system into a
financially successful concern," or the cost of the going-concern
part of the plant, is only evidence of the present value of the going-
concern element. But, of course, if so-called present value is calcu-
lated on the prudent-investment basis, i.e., if present value is used
essentially in the sense of the amount prudently invested and prop-
erly managed, such depreciation would be improper. Hence under
either the present-value theory or the prudent-investment theory
it may well be that in a given case there is little or no going-concern
value or going-concern investment that is properly allowable as a
part of the rate base.
[In the discussion of this paper a question was raised as to
whether it is justifiable to start with an admittedly unsound pre-
mise (for it is herein admitted that present value is an unsound
rate base) and to follow the argument out to its logical conclusion.
And in order to dispel any similar misapprehension this paragraph
is intercalated. Of course, it is better to be right than to be
logical, 51 if one cannot be both. But no part of going value is
herein included simply because it is logically a part of present
value. For example, good-will value, though logically a part of
going value is, in the argument, excluded from the rate base.
And going value is included only to the extent necessary to secure
a maximum of interests with a minimum sacrifice of other interests.
To be specific, only such going-concern value as represents the
results of prudent investment 2 in building up the going concern
or in establishing the business should be included. If there has
been no such investment-if the business was established without
the expenditure of money or effort, then, under the present-value
theory there should be no allowance for going value. In substance
the argument in this respect is that reason, in general, and the
prudent-investment doctrine, in particular, require the inclusion
in the rate base of the amount, if any, prudently invested in the
"9 This depreciation, like the ordinary depreciation of the physical part of the
plant, should be met annually out of operating expenses, and, if not properly met,
such accrued depreciation, like the ordinary accrued depreciation of the physical
part of the plant, should not be capitalized as value for purposes of rate regulation.
See City of Knoxville -v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 13-14 (1909).
00 The Minnesota Rate Cases, supra note 49.
31 See HOLmEs, THE COzzitON LAW, 1 (1881): "The life of the law has not
been logic."
-' See 2 WHITTEN, VALUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION, 1214, 1215 (Sup-
plement, 1914): "When, therefore we speak of going-value as an element of fair
value for rate purposes it must be assumed that such value will be based on a
necessary cost actually entering into the cost of production."
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going-concern part of the plant. The Supreme Court requires the
adoption of the present-value doctrine. Therefore, since this invest-
ment, if any, in the going concern should be protected, this invest-
ment should be reflected in the rate base under the present-value
doctrine.5 3]
Of course, any discussion of this question, unless purely theoreti-
cal, is necessarily rather unsatisfactory, for the reason that the
problem must be discussed largely on the unsatisfactory theory of
the majority of the Supreme Court that the rate base is the value
of the property. The adoption of the prudent-investment doctrine,
as advocated by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes,
would not only clarify this nebulous question, but, among other
things, by establishing "a definite stable and readily ascertainable"
rate base, would, as compared with the "orthodox" present-value
doctrine, more adequately secure the various important interests
involved, particularly the paramount social interest in the general
security, including stability in the public utility field, would thus
promote the socialization of the law,;, and better subserve the
true purpose of law. Mr. Justice Brandies and Mr. Justice Holmes
("may their tribe increase!") have dramatically set the stage
for the majority of the Court to act out a theory tbh.t would bring
about, or tend to bring about, "a consummation devoutly to be
wished."
Accordingly, because of the peculiar difficulty and uncertainty in calculating
the value of the Intangible going-concern part of the plant, and because a calcula-
tion of such value involves perhaps the most vicious part of "the vicious circle," it
seems best to calculate so-called going-concern value by merely estimating the
amount prudently invested and properly maintained in the going-concern part of the
plant, thus avoiding undue difficulty, uncertainty and the vicious circle, and at the
same time adequately securing the important property interests of the investors and
the interest of society In the general security, without sacrificing any countervailing
conflicting interests.
" By the term "socialization of law" is meant the recent emphasis which the
law is putting "upon social interests; upon the demands or claims or desires
involved in social life rather than upon the qualities of the abstract man in vacuo
or upon the freedom of the will of the individual." POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMmoN LAw, 195 (1921). In the nineteenth century the law emphasized the
wants or Interests of the isolated Individual. But today the law is tending toward
"a more embracing and mnre effective securing of social interests." See PouND,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 99 (1922).
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